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The objective of this policy paper is to identify and propose high-level legal and 
regulatory reforms to the financial system structure that would enhance efficiency and/or 
mitigate risks by: 
•  removing unnecessary regulatory barriers or filling in existing gaps in order to 
let market forces determine the most appropriate financial structure 
•  clarifying, completing and ensuring consistency in the prudential framework. 
The paper does not cover all dimensions of the financial system structure and, given tight 
time constraints and fine-tuning considerations that are beyond the scope of this exercise, 
does not provide an in-depth analysis of each reform proposal. 
 
The Colombian financial system had historically developed under a model of 
specialized ‘vehicles’ subject to severe restrictions on permissible activities, especially 
for deposit-taking institutions. Law 45/1990 converted the system into one of “multi-
banking” (matrix-subsidiaries) and promoted the creation of financial conglomerates. 
Legal reforms during the last fifteen years have provided more flexibility but have not 
fundamentally changed the overall picture. However, the current model is already de 
facto close to universal banking because of the presence of financial conglomerates, 
although it is more inefficient because their structures are not fully market-determined. 
This has historically led to the duplication of resources, operational inefficiencies and 
lower economies of scale, while ‘isolation’ has also inhibited cross-selling efforts across 
group companies. 
 
The number of financial institutions has declined, while the relative importance of 
institutional investors and capital markets has increased, over the last 10 years. The 
banking sector has mostly recovered from the 1999 crisis, although financial 
intermediation has been slow to pick up. Colombia’s financial system is dominated by 
financial conglomerates, the most important of which belong to domestic mixed-activity 
economic groups. Due to the existence of financial conglomerates, market concentration 
is considerably greater than conventional measures would suggest. Financial 
conglomerates are already leveraging many operational synergies, which are expected to 
increase following the process of consolidation that is already underway in some of them. 
At the same time, a single integrated financial supervisor has recently been created. 
 
An analytical approach is developed to qualitatively assess the benefits of proposed 
reforms, given the difficulties of a priori quantifying their impact. The approach seeks to 
operationalize the paper’s objective by applying general principles (market orientation, 
contestability, risk mitigation and transparency, efficiency) to screen suitable reforms, 
and an evaluation framework (benefits, risks, ease of implementation, impact) to assess 
their relative strengths and weaknesses. Selected reforms are also compared to 
international practice, particularly in selected peer countries (Chile, Mexico, Spain). 
 
Five specific and four general reforms to the financial system structure are proposed, 
and are summarized in the Table below. Each of the former affects (at least) one  
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particular type of financial intermediary, while the latter are cross-cutting since they 
affect – directly or indirectly – all entities that form part of the financial system. 
 
1 Allow banks to offer financial leasing services directly
2
Introduce a specialized vehicle whose exclusive responsibility would be the management of 
collective investment schemes
3
Allow banks to offer services currently provided by fiduciarias, with the exception of collective 
investment schemes
4A
Allow banks to offer all types of investment banking services, with the exception of long-term equity 
investments in the real sector
4B
Develop a full-fledged investment banking vehicle by strengthening Comisionistas de Bolsa and 
eliminating Corporaciones Financieras
4C
Allow all credit institutions to finance the acquisition of real sector companies, subject to standard 
prudential requirements and credit procedures
5 Eliminate the vehicle of Sociedades de Capitalización
1
Review and revise the legal framework for the financial system in terms of hierarchy, consistency 
and breadth of coverage
2
Review, revise and clarify the existing legal and regulatory framework for the prevention of conflicts 
of interest
3
Review and revise the regulations defining reserved financial activities that are subject to 
supervision and the entities that could perform them
4A Give financial supervisors the right to presume whether a company is related to a financial group
4B
Introduce legislation that would inhibit authorization for complex and/or non-transparent financial 







The motivations underlying the specific recommendations can be conceptually 
classified into exclusivity (i.e. the current framework unnecessarily restricts a financial 
activity to a non-bank vehicle, or prohibits it altogether), fragmentation (i.e. the current 
framework leads to the improper fragmentation of a financial activity across different 
vehicles that operate in distinct market segments and are subject to different regulations) 
and obsolescence (i.e. the historical rationale for the existence of certain vehicles is no 
longer valid given recent market developments). 
 
Certain specific reforms – such as, for example, allowing banks to directly offer 
financial leasing, fiduciary activities and most investment banking services – encourage  
greater market choice and potentially increase operational efficiencies. The reforms also 
promote competition since, in addition to extending bank permissible activities, they 
allow niche players to continue operating in each market via specialized vehicles. Other 
specific reforms – such as, for example, introducing a specialized vehicle to manage 
collective investment schemes and developing a full-fledged investment banking vehicle 
– reduce regulatory arbitrage and conflicts of interest, as well as potentially stimulate 
market development and encourage greater efficiency via scale economies. General 
reforms introduce greater legal certainty, transparency and understanding by market 
participants, ensure the consistent application of rules, and promote financial stability. 
 
The aforementioned recommendations promote a more sound, transparent and 
market-oriented financial system, but their overall impact on the system’s efficiency is 
likely to be moderate. The proposed reforms will also change relatively little in terms of 
supervisory or antitrust priorities, but would significantly strengthen the consolidated 
supervision of financial conglomerates. The authorities will need to develop a carefully 
sequenced reform roadmap that clearly distinguishes between shorter- and longer-term 
policy measures based on considerations such as relative importance, ease of 




The objective of this policy paper
1 is to identify and propose legal and regulatory 
reforms to the financial system structure that would enhance efficiency and/or 
mitigate risks by: 
•  Removing unnecessary regulatory barriers or filling in existing gaps in order 
to let market forces determine the most appropriate financial structure 
•  Clarifying, completing and ensuring consistency in the prudential framework. 
 
Given the breadth of this topic, only selected high-level reform proposals are 
considered. The financial system structure can be addressed from many different 
dimensions, and the paper does not aim to cover all of them
2. Its starting point is the 
current organizational set-up of the Colombian financial system and not an idealized 
model. Given tight time constraints and in light of fine-tuning and timing considerations 
that are beyond the scope of this exercise, an in-depth analysis of each reform proposal 
has not been attempted; this means that some proposals may require further research in 
order to provide sufficient details to policymakers for the elaboration of the required 
regulations. The document does not attempt to cover in detail the historical evolution of 
the financial structure and its characteristics, or specific modifications to existing laws 
and regulations. The current supervisory and antitrust framework is also not evaluated in 
detail, although potential implications stemming from the proposed reforms (and vice 
versa) will be identified and highlighted. 
 
An analytical approach is developed to qualitatively assess the benefits of 
proposed reforms, given the difficulties of a priori quantifying their impact. The 
merits of each proposed reform (either legal or regulatory), which have been identified in 
the literature or through conversations with policy makers and the industry, are evaluated 
based on an analytical approach developed in this paper. The experience of structures in 
other countries is used to compare and contrast (where appropriate) the different 
approaches that have been taken in each area. However, although these reforms generate 
positive results in terms of the cost-benefit trade-off and impact, their quantification is 
hampered for several reasons. Firstly, many of the benefits – especially those related to 
the prudential framework – are indirect and are derived from a more transparent and 
sound financial system. Secondly, greater market choice implies that much will depend 
on the voluntary response of market participants, who may decide (for other reasons) not 
to take advantage of the additional flexibility in some of these measures. Finally, there 
are many details to be worked out among relevant parties for each reform proposal that 




                                                 
1 The document draws from recently-completed operational work undertaken as part of the World Bank’s 
non-lending technical assistance program in Colombia. 
2 For example, the impact on financial system structure stemming from the tax code and from Central Bank 
foreign exchange regulations that influence onshore versus offshore bank operations is not considered.  
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The paper is structured as follows: 
•  Brief review of the legal and regulatory framework and some stylized facts 
about the Colombian financial system (section II) 
•  Elaboration of an analytical approach to assess the relative attractiveness of 
different reforms, and description of five specific and four general reforms to 
the financial system structure that are supported by this approach (section III) 
•  Summary of the main conclusions and policy recommendations, including the 
likely implications for supervision and competition (section IV).  
  8
II. Background 
A. Evolution of legal and regulatory framework 
 
The Colombian financial system had historically developed under a specialized 
model
3. This model had three main characteristics: 
•  specialized legal vehicles, each of them designed for different financial 
objectives, with specific and sometimes exclusive permissible activities; 
•  isolation between different financial system vehicles, through restrictions or 
prohibitions on cross-shareholdings and Board of Directors participation 
between financial companies; 
•  severe investment restrictions for deposit-taking institutions, including the 
prohibition of equity investments in the real sector. 
 
Law 45/1990 introduced significant changes to this model. In particular, this law 
permitted equity participations between some financial companies, thereby converting the 
system into one of “multi-banking” (matrix-subsidiaries) and promoting the creation of 
financial conglomerates. The law also allowed some financial companies (but not banks) 
to invest in the real sector, permitted foreign investments in the financial sector, and 
accelerated the privatization process of nationalized financial companies. 
 
Legal reforms during the last fifteen years have provided more flexibility but 
have not fundamentally changed the multi-banking model. As can be seen in the 
Table below, new laws introduced in the last 15 years have changed permissible activities 
for some entities (e.g. Law 795/2003), have created new financial institutions (Law 
454/1998) and/or have eliminated existing ones (e.g. Law 546/1999). However, with the 
possible exception of the elimination of the housing bank vehicle (CAV, subsequently 
renamed BECH), the model of specialized financial service provision has not been 
significantly affected. The consolidation of laws and regulations under the “Estatuto 
Orgánico del Sistema Financiero” (EOSF) in 1993 (and subsequently updated) defined 
financial institutions under the supervision of the Superintendencia de Bancos (Banking 
Superintendency)
4 as being comprised of: 
•  credit institutions (banks, corporaciones financieras, compañías de 
financiamiento comercial and cooperativas financieras) responsible for 
financial intermediation 
•  financial service companies (fiduciarias, almacenes generales de depósito, 
sociedades administradoras de fondos de pensiones y de cesantía) 
•  sociedades de capitalización 
•  insurance companies, and insurance and reinsurance brokers. 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Clavijo S. (2000). 
4 The EOSF did not cover stock exchanges or securities firms (e.g. comisionistas de bolsa), which were 
generally subject to separate laws (Ley de Valores) and whose regulation and supervision was primarily the 
responsibility of the Superintendencia de Valores (Securities Superintendency).  
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Table 1: Main Legal Reforms to Financial System Structure (1990-2005) 
Dismantles fiduciary sections of banks and obliges the creation of separate fiduciaria vehicle
Allows banks, CFCs and CFs to take majority equity positions in financial service companies (fiduciarias, leasing 
companies, comisionistas de bolsa, almacenes generales de deposito and AFPs)
Denotes leasing companies as financial service companies
Establishes permissible activities for comisionistas de bolsa as a sociedad anonima, and places them under the 
licensing and supervision of the Comisión Nacional de Valores
Establishes minimum capital required to operate a financial institution (different by type of entity)
Facilitates merger and acquisition activities by financial institutions
Allows banks to invest in CFCs specialized in leasing
Allows investments by housing banks (CAVs) in financial service companies under the same terms as for credit 
institutions
Allows CAVs to offer consumer financing in addition to mortgages
Allows CAVs and CFCs to act as foreign exchange intermediaries
Mandatory conversion of all leasing companies into CFCs 
Redefines functions of financial cooperatives and denotes them as credit institutions
Redefines credit institutions as banks, CAVs, CFs, CFCs, and financial cooperatives
Allows CAVs to offer consumer financing in addition to mortgages
Allows CAVs to take majority equity positions in financial service companies (fiduciarias, leasing companies, 
comisionistas de bolsa, almacenes generales de deposito and AFPs)
Eliminates the figure of CFC specialized in leasing (one type of CFC for all activities)
Allows comisionistas de bolsa to act as foreign exchange intermediaries
Revises minimum capital required to operate a financial institution (different by type of entity)
Law 546/1999 Mandatory conversion of CAVs into banks within 3 years
Allows banks and CFCs to offer housing leasing
Applies bank prudential requirements to CFCs, CFs, financial cooperatives and sociedades de capitalizacion
Authorizes CFCs to offer microcredit operations
Revises minimum capital required to operate a financial institution (different by type of entity)








The existing framework continues to require distinct institutional ‘vehicles’ in 
order to be able to offer a full range of financial services. The main vehicles are:  
•  establecimientos bancarios, which are commercial banks that can offer the 
full scale of retail (including mortgage) and corporate banking services with 
the exception of investment banking and financial leasing
5  
•  Corporaciones Financieras (CFs), which can offer most corporate and 
investment banking services, but cannot fund themselves with demand 
deposits   
•  Compañías de Financiamiento Comercial (CFCs), which are finance 
companies offering lending and/or leasing services, but cannot fund 
themselves with demand deposits 
•  fiduciarias, which are a combination of asset management and trust/fiduciary 
activities vehicle 
•  comisionistas de bolsa, which are brokers and broker-dealers offering most 
investment banking and some fund management services  
•  insurance companies (life and non-life) and brokers 
•  sociedades administradoras de fondos de pensiones y de cesantía, which 
mainly manage mandatory defined contribution pension schemes (AFPs). 
                                                 
5 There are also offshore bank subsidiaries of domestic banks, which mainly act as a conduit for foreign 
currency-related (deposit taking, loans, investments) and other activities that are not permitted onshore.  
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Other financial institutions include cooperativas financieras (financial cooperatives), 
casas de cambio (foreign exchange houses), almacenes generales de depósito (bonded 
warehouses) and sociedades de capitalización (see section III for a description).  
  
The current model is already de facto close to universal banking because of 
financial conglomerates, but it is more inefficient because their structures are not 
fully market-determined. Market consolidation, foreign entry and the partial relaxation 
of permissible activities over the last decade have mostly aligned Colombia’s regulatory 
framework to international practice and have led to increasing conglomeration in the 
financial system
6. However, the actual financial conglomerate structures are not fully 
market-determined as they are shaped by very specific prohibitions of equity 
participation across different financial intermediaries
7. This has historically led to the 
duplication of resources, operational inefficiencies and lower economies of scale, while 
‘isolation’ has also inhibited cross-selling efforts across group companies. 
 
B. Market characteristics and recent developments 
 
Both the number of financial institutions and the relative importance of banks in 
the financial system have declined over the last 10 years. In particular, the number of 
financial (particularly credit) institutions has declined as many of them were merged, 
purchased by commercial banks or liquidated (see Table below)
8. In fact, most of the 
burden of adjustment to the 1998-99 crisis fell on the smaller, independent and more 
specialized entities (i.e. CFs, CFCs, fiduciarias, financial cooperatives and housing 
banks) that followed distinct and heterogeneous business models
9. In addition, the 
relative importance of institutional investors (i.e. AFPs, insurance companies and – partly 
– fiduciarias) has increased compared to the banking sector (see Figure below). This – 
together with greater bond investments in bank portfolios – has contributed to the 
significant increase in daily market trading volumes over the same time period, 
particularly in fixed income (from Col$1 trillion in 1995 to Col$12 trillion in 2005
10). 
However, the vast majority of institutional investor assets remains invested in 
government bonds – in fact, annual debt and equity issuance by the non-financial private 
sector between 2001-2005 is estimated to be around 1 percent of GDP – so banks 
continue to represent the main institutional vehicle for private sector financing.  
                                                 
6 In fact, one could argue that the requirement to maintain specialized financial vehicles has supported the 
process of financial conglomeration. 
7 For example, while insurance companies can own banks, the latter cannot own other domestic banks and 
can only hold majority participations in fiduciarias, CFCs or CFs. 
8 As many as 35 entities were intervened for liquidation between 1998 and 2003, and another 20 were 
voluntarily liquidated by their shareholders. 
9 Facing the risk of a broader systemic crisis and a run on deposits in 1998-99, the Government embarked 
on a series of economic emergency measures to address financial system problems. These measures can be 
conceptually divided into those aiming primarily to restore the health of the system (financial system 
support operations) and those that provided support to debtors (relief or “alivios” and restructuring 
programs). Financial system support consisted of private and public sector bank cleanup and 
recapitalization operations. 
10 As of end-December 2005, US$1 was equivalent to 2,288 Colombian pesos (Col$).  
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Table 2: Number of Financial Institutions (1995-2005) 
1995 2000 2005
Number of Institutions 279 196 154
Commercial and Housing B a n k s 4 13 02 1
Private domestic 21 15 12
Public 5 4 3
Foreign1 2 1 1 6
Solidarios 3 0 0
Other Credit Institutions 98 54 32
Corporaciones Financieras (CF) 24 8 2
Compañias de Financiamiento Comercial (CFC) 73 32 24
Financial Cooperatives N/A 13 5
Organismos Cooperativos de Grado Superior (OCGS) 111
Instituciones Oficiales Especiales (IOEs) 69 1 0
Almacenes Generales de Deposito 11 9 6
Insurance Companies 60 50 44
Life 35 27 24
Non-Life 25 23 20
Sociedades de Capitalización 8 5 5
Pension Funds 9 6 6
Fiduciarias 46 33 30
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera. 
Note: IOEs refers to second-tier public development banks. Comisionistas de bolsa and other financial entities (e.g. sociedades 
administradoras de inversión) are excluded from the analysis because their respective numbers were not available for 1995. 
 
 



















Commercial and Housing Banks Other Credit Institutions Insurance Companies Pension Funds Fiduciarias
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera and own analysis. 
Note: The above figure shows total assets for credit institutions (including sociedades de capitalización), total assets under 
management for insurance companies and pension funds, and only investment assets for fiduciarias. Other financial institutions are 
excluded from the analysis either because of small asset size and data unavailability (e.g. comisionistas de bolsa, administradoras de 
inversión) or because they are already indirectly captured in the above figures (e.g. IOEs).  
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The banking sector has mostly recovered from the 1999 crisis, although financial 
intermediation has been slow to pick up. After a long period of shrinkage due to the 
crisis, banking sector size begun to recover in 2004 and standard financial performance 
indicators – solvency, profitability, efficiency and asset quality – have significantly 
improved (see Table below). The recovery can be attributed to a combination of factors, 
such as the resumption of economic growth, a slightly increasing net interest margin in 
spite of declining interest rates, the post-crisis recapitalization programs (particularly for 
public banks), as well as the exit and/or restructuring of a significant quantity of non-
performing assets. However, financial intermediation has not yet recovered – in 
particular, net loans and leases plummeted from 36 percent to 25 percent of GDP over 
1998-2003 and have only started to increase again in the last two years. By contrast, 
security holdings (mostly sovereign) have more than doubled as a proportion of GDP 
over this period and now represent one-third of banking sector assets. 
 
Table 3: Financial Performance of Credit Institutions (1998-2005) 
Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05
NOMINAL GROWTH RATES
Net Loans & Leases -5% -9% 0% 5% 7% 21% 18%
Securities 29% 42% 29% 13% 16% 28% 18%
Deposits 8% 2% 9% 5% 8% 21% 17%
Total Assets 1% 0% 5% 6% 9% 18% 17%
AS % OF GDP
Net Loans & Leases 36% 32% 25% 23% 23% 22% 23% 25%
Securities 7% 8% 10% 12% 12% 13% 15% 16%
Deposits 33% 33% 29% 29% 28% 27% 30% 32%
Total Assets 57% 53% 46% 45% 44% 42% 45% 48%
SOLVENCY
Net Worth/Total Assets 10.6% 11.0% 11.3% 11.2% 11.0% 11.6% 12.1% 12.3%
Capital Adequacy Ratio 10.9% 13.2% 13.3% 12.5% 13.1% 13.8% 13.5%
PROFITABILITY
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) -2.5% -3.5% -2.3% 0.1% 1.1% 1.9% 2.7% 2.7%
Return on Average Net Worth (ROAE) -21.0% -32.6% -20.7% 1.1% 9.6% 17.1% 23.0% 22.1%
Net Interest Margin (Net Interest Income/Average Assets) 4.1% 3.0% 3.5% 3.1% 3.4% 3.9% 4.2% 4.1%
EFFICIENCY
Cost-Income Ratio (Operating Expenses/Gross Income) 71% 81% 80% 74% 71% 62% 54% 51%
Operating Expenses/Average Assets 6.4% 6.7% 6.4% 6.3% 6.1% 5.4% 4.9%
Labor Costs/Operating Expenses 51% 46% 42% 43% 43% 44% 46% 45%
Number of Bank Employees 76,478 69,766 59,908 56,758 55,658 54,474 55,678
ASSET QUALITY
Past Due Loans/Total Gross Loans 10.7% 13.6% 11.0% 9.7% 8.7% 6.8% 3.3% 2.6%
Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans 16.3% 16.4% 15.4% 13.6% 10.5% 5.8% 4.4%
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Gross Loans 4.1% 5.0% 6.2% 7.5% 7.6% 6.7% 4.8% 4.3%
Loan Loss Provisions/Non-Performing Loans 31% 38% 49% 56% 64% 82% 97%
Gross Loan Composition
Commercial 53% 55% 59% 58% 62% 63% 67% 65%
Consumer 18% 13% 14% 16% 16% 18% 20% 24%
Microcredit 1% 1% 1% 2%
Mortgages 29% 31% 27% 26% 22% 18% 11% 9%
MEMO ITEM
Real GDP Growth 0.6% -4.2% 2.9% 1.5% 1.9% 4.1% 4.1% 5.1%
Inflation Rate (end-period) 16.7% 9.2% 8.7% 7.6% 7.0% 6.5% 5.5% 5.0%
Nominal 90-day deposit rate (% p.a.) 34.1% 15.8% 13.4% 11.5% 7.7% 7.9% 7.7%
Exchange Rate vs. USD (end-period) 1,542 1,874 2,229 2,291 2,865 2,778 2,390 2,288
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, IMF, Asobancaria and own analysis. 
Note: Credit institutions include commercial and housing banks, CFs and CFCs, but exclude IOEs and financial cooperatives. 
 
It is unclear to what extent Colombia’s current financial system structure 
hinders performance, at least when compared with regional peers. Some academic 
studies in the past have convincingly argued that Colombia’s financial system structure 
has contributed to high operational costs. As can be seen in the Table below, although 
Colombia has a proportionally smaller and ‘shallower’ – in terms of access – financial  
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system than Chile and Brazil (but not Mexico), it is currently not very different in overall 
bank financial performance. In particular, relatively higher revenue-generating capacity 
helps to offset higher operating expenses (relative to assets), potentially indicating scope 
for operational improvements arising from greater consolidation and scale economies. 
However, the extent to which such improvements can be attained solely by changes to the 
current financial system structure (as opposed to the macroeconomic environment or 
individual financial group strategies) remains unclear. 
 
Table 4: Comparative Performance of Financial Systems in Selected Countries 
(latest available) 
Colombia Chile Brazil Mexico Year
SIZE / DEPTH
Total Bank Assets (US$ Billion) 59 119 715 209 2005
Total Bank Assets (% of GDP) 42% 95% 86% 27% 2005
Stock Market Capitalization (% of GDP) 26% 124% 55% 25% 2004
Number of Listed Firms 114 239 357 152 2004
Amount Outstanding of Domestic Private Bonds (% of GDP) 8% 23.3% 12.6% 3.4% 2004
ACCESS
Credit to the Private Sector (% of GDP) 23% 62% 36% 17% 2004
Branches per 100,000 People 8.7 9.4 14.6 7.6 2002-03
ATMs per 100,000 People 9.6 24.0 17.8 16.6 2002-04
SOLVENCY
Bank Capital to Assets 11.4% 6.8% 16.0% 12.0% Sep-Dec. 2005
Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio 12.5% 14.2% 18.2% 14.4% Sep. 2005
PROFITABILITY
Bank Return on Assets 2.5% 1.4% 2.0% 1.9% Sep-Dec. 2005
Bank Return on Equity 25.7% 18.7% 20.8% 15.8% 2005
EFFICIENCY
Bank Cost-Income Ratio (Operating Expenses/Gross Income) 51% 52% 58% 60% 2005
Bank Operating Expenses/Total Assets 4.6% 2.3% 6.9% 4.6% 2005
ASSET QUALITY
Bank Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans 3.2% 1.0% 4.1% 2.0% Jun-Dec. 2005
Bank Provisions/Non-Performing Loans 144% 166% 153% 232% Mar-Sep. 2005
FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Legal Rights Index 4 4 2 2 2005
Credit Information Index 4 6 5 6 2005
Investor Protection Index 5.7 5.7 5.3 3.7 2005
Cost of Enforcing Contracts (% of Debt) 18.6% 10.4% 15.5% 20.0% 2005
 
Source: Superintendencies and Central Banks, IMF, World Bank, Standard and Poor’s, BIS and own analysis. 
Note: Some financial performance ratios are based on reported Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) that are not fully comparable 
across countries. The ratios for Colombia include all credit institutions and might differ from those estimated using figures provided 
by the Superintendencia Financiera (previous Table). The size of the private sector debt market in Colombia is an estimate. 
 
Colombia’s financial system is dominated by financial conglomerates, the most 
important of which belong to domestic mixed-activity economic groups. Using a 
variant of the Joint Forum definition to account for the presence and importance of AFPs 
in Colombia’s financial system
11, it can be seen in the Figure and Tables below that 
                                                 
11 The Joint Forum was established in 1996 under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International  
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financial conglomerates – i.e. a group of companies under common control whose 
exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least 
two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance, pensions) – dominate the 
financial system
12. The most important financial conglomerates are controlled by 
domestic mixed-activity economic groups. The two main groups (Aval and Sindicato) 
each own several financial institutions and together represented half of total bank assets 
as of December 2005, up from 31 percent as of the end of 1998. 
Table 5: Five Largest Firms by Market Segment (2005) 
Ranking by Size Banks CFCs Fiduciarias Comisionistas Insurance Pensions
1
Bancolombia       
(Grupo Sindicato)
Suleasing           
(Grupo Sindicato)
Fiducolombia        
(Grupo Sindicato)




Porvenir            
(Grupo Aval)
2








Vidalfa                
(Grupo Aval)
Proteccion        
(Grupo Sindicato)
3 BBVA








Horizonte          
(BBVA)
4
Banco de Occidente 
(Grupo Aval)
Leasing de Credito 
(Helm Financial)
Fiduoccidente      
(Grupo Aval)
Suvalor               
(Grupo Sindicato)
Bolivar Vida            
(Grupo Bolivar)
Colfondos        
(Citigroup)
5




Fidupopular        
(Grupo Aval)
Alianza                
(independent)
Previsora              
(State-owned)
Santander
Market Share of 
Top 5
52% 58% 56% 52% 40% 93%
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera and own analysis. 
Note: Size is based on total assets (banks and CFCs), annual debt and equity buying volumes (comisionistas de bolsa), total assets 
under management (fiduciarias), total life and non-life assets (insurance), and total AFP assets under management (pensions).  
 
Table 6: Entities Controlled by Largest Financial Conglomerates (latest available) 





Bogota, Occidente, Union 
Colombiano, Popular, 
Megabanco, Av. Vilas
Bancolombia Davivienda Agrario, Granbanco BBVA
CFs Corfivalle Colcorp
CFCs
Leasing del Valle, Leasing 



















Casa de Bolsa, Valores Bogota, 
Valores de Occidente, Valores 
del Popular














BBVA Vida, BBVA 
Seguros
Pensions AFP Porvenir AFP Protección AFP Horizonte
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
Note: All firms controlled by a financial conglomerate (the Government of Colombia is included here) are shown per market segment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), in order to take forward the work of the Tripartite Group on a 
range of issues relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates.  
12 The dominance of financial conglomerates in the securities markets is much greater than the figures 
shown by comisionistas de bolsa, since the total 2005 debt buying volumes by banks (most of which are 
owned by financial conglomerates) was double the volume of comisionistas.  
  15





























Domestic Mixed-Activity Conglomerate Foreign Financial Conglomerate
State-owned Domestic 'Pure' Financial Conglomerate
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera and own analysis. 
Note: Percentages are market shares of all firms controlled by a group for each type of financial vehicle (the Government of 
Colombia is classified separately here). They are based on total assets (banks and CFCs), total debt and equity buying volumes for 
2005 (comisionistas de bolsa), total assets under management (fiduciarias), total life and non-life assets (insurance), and total AFP 
assets under management (pensions). 
 
Table 7: Classification of Financial Conglomerates (latest available) 
Banks CFCs Fiduciarias Comisionistas Insurance Pensions
Grupo Aval 29% 19% 25% 4% 9% 27%
Construction and 
real estate
4 banks (Bogota, Occidente, 
Villas, Popular)
Grupo Sindicato 20% 41% 25% 8% 22% 24% Cement, retail, food
Recently consolidated activities 
into one bank (Bancolombia)
Grupo Bolivar 7% 3% 3% 1% 9% Construction Davivienda
State-owned 12% 2% 22% 6% Banco Agrario, Granbanco
BBVA 11% 3% 0% 3% 17%
BBVA acquired Granahorrar in 
privatization tender in late 2005
Citigroup 3% 1% 6% 14% Citibank
Santander 3% 2% 0% 11% Santander
Skandia 1% 2% 7% N/A
Mercantil Colpatria 3% 1% 7% Construction Red Multibanca Colpatria
Helm Financial Services 2% 8% 2% 0% Banco de Credito
Fundacion Social 4% 0% 2% Banco Caja Social
Market Share Non-Financial 
Activities
Banking Sector Presence Financial Conglomerate
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera and own analysis. 
Note: Percentages are market shares of all firms controlled by a group (the Government of Colombia is also included here) for each 
type of financial vehicle. They are based on total assets (banks and CFCs), total debt and equity buying volumes for 2005 
(comisionistas), total assets under management (fiduciarias), total life and non-life assets (insurance), and total AFP assets under 
management (pensions). Foreign and domestic entities that are primarily active in only one financial sector (e.g. Banistmo and Banco 
GNB Sudameris in banking, AIG and RSA in insurance) are excluded from the definition of financial conglomerates.  
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Due to the existence of financial conglomerates, market concentration is 
considerably greater than conventional measures would suggest. For example, bank 
concentration – as measured by the Herfindahl Index (HI) of asset share at the individual 
bank level – was only 877 as of end-2005, which is significantly below the level of a 
concentrated market
13. However, this calculation ignores the presence of financial 
conglomerates such as, for example, Grupo Aval, which controls four banks, each with 
its own CFC, fiduciaria and comisionista de bolsa. Taking these into account and treating 
the two public-owned banks as one group, the adjusted HI based on December 2005 
figures rises to 1655, indicating a considerably greater market concentration.  
 
Financial conglomerates are already leveraging many operational synergies.  
There exist different levels of collaboration and operational integration across different 
financial groups. Management control is typically exercised at the level of each financial 
entity, subject to an overall group direction dictated by the main controller(s), including 
via participation in the relevant Board of Directors. Sales distribution  contracts 
(“contratos de red”), which are permissible under the current regulations, allow 
insurance companies, sociedades de capitalización, fiduciarias and comisionistas to sell 
their services using the network of the group’s credit institutions; in addition, CFCs and 
CFs can use the group bank’s branches to sell certificates of deposit. Some financial 
groups also share procurement, office space, back office processing, systems and risk 
management, although the practice differs depending on group strategy and the 
interpretation of the relevant laws and regulations (see General Reform 2). As a result, 
many of the efficiency benefits stemming from common ownership have been attained, 
albeit in a haphazard and inconsistent manner. 
 
A process of restructuring and consolidation is already underway in some 
financial conglomerates to allow them to compete more effectively and access new 
capital. For example, Grupo Sindicato recently completed the merger of its three main 
credit institutions (Bancolombia, CFC Corfinsura and Conavi). In addition, Grupo Aval 
has merged its two CFs (Corfivalle and Corficolombiana), while the two banks 
respectively controlled by Fundación Social (Banco Caja Social and Banco Colmena) and 
by Grupo Bolivar (Davivienda and Bansuperior) have also merged. Some of this activity 
has allegedly been prompted by the forthcoming free trade agreement with the United 
States, which is expected to attract foreign investors in the financial system. It has also 
been facilitated by the improvement in the macroeconomic environment and bank 
financial performance over the last few years, as evidenced by the successful 
privatizations of Granahorrar (purchased by BBVA) and Megabanco (purchased by 
Grupo Aval
14) in the last nine months. The ongoing, market-driven process of creating 
larger financial institutions could lead to even greater efficiency gains because of 
economies of scale arising from operational integration. 
                                                 
13 The HI is a measure of market concentration, which is calculated as the sum of the squares of relative 
shares and lies between 0 and 10,000. According to the merger guidelines of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, a post-merger HI of 1,800 and over indicates a concentrated market, an HI between 1,000 and 
1,800, moderately concentrated, and an HI below 1,000, not concentrated. 
14 Grupo Aval has also acquired another small bank (Banco Union Colombiano) in December 2005, which 
it will subsume under Banco de Occidente.  
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A single integrated financial supervisor has recently been created. In particular, 
the banking, insurance and pensions supervisory agency (Superintendencia Bancaria, 
SB) and the securities supervisory agency (Superintendencia de Valores, SV) merged in 
January 2006 into an integrated financial supervisor (Superintendencia Financiera, SF). 
Consolidation of supervisory responsibilities is supported as a means of reducing inter-
agency coordination and operating costs, mitigating regulatory arbitrage and 
strengthening overall financial regulation and supervision, although the technical and 
organizational challenges of smoothly integrating the two agencies remain significant. 
  
  18
III.  Analytical Approach and Proposed Reforms 
 
A. Analytical Approach 
 
In order to assess the attractiveness of different reform options, an analytical 
approach has been developed and is described in this section. As mentioned earlier, 
the main objective of this exercise is to identify and propose legal and regulatory reforms  
to the financial system structure that would enhance efficiency and/or mitigate risks. The 
analytical approach seeks to operationalize this objective by developing general 
principles to guide all proposed reforms and an evaluation framework to assess the 
specific merits and weaknesses of individual reforms. As can be deduced, the approach is 
not ‘anchored’ on a specific industrial organization model but rather on a practical cost-
benefit analysis of each proposed reform based on the aforementioned approach, with the 
starting point being the current organizational set-up of the Colombian financial system.  
 
General principles are based on good international practice in financial sector 
reform and facilitate the identification of suitable reforms. The four interrelated 
principles mentioned below – derived from international experience in financial sector 
reform – provide a set of criteria/desired features with which to compare the relative 
attractiveness of different reforms: 
•  Market orientation – reforms should follow actual market developments and 
allow market choice (for example, by permitting banks to choose whether to 
offer a specific product directly or via a separate vehicle) to the extent that 
they do not unduly increase risks 
•  Contestability  – given the dominant presence of a few large financial groups, 
reforms should ensure that smaller or niche market players can compete 
effectively (for example, via specialized legal vehicles that do not require a 
full bank license, or via a single bank with more permissible activities) 
•  Risk mitigation and transparency – reforms should reduce (or at least not 
exacerbate) and make more transparent the existing risks in the financial 
system for both supervisors and end-users; these risks are defined broadly so 
as to cover systemic stability considerations (including access to the bank 
safety net), regulatory arbitrage and conflicts of interest. 
•  Efficiency – reforms should provide incentives for greater efficiency in the 
provision of financial services to end  users, which can arise from greater 
economies of scale, better-structured internal operations (X-efficiency), and 
from a more consistent and clear legal framework. 
 
The evaluation framework assesses the specific merits and weaknesses of 
individual reforms. In addition to the aforementioned general principles that ‘screen’ the 
selection of suitable reform options, there exist other considerations that policy makers 
need to take into account, such as the ease of implementation of these reforms and their 
potential impact on the financial system. Even though both of these factors are difficult to 
quantify a priori and depend on ‘fine tuning’ considerations requiring the active  
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involvement of all relevant parties, they are relevant when evaluating the overall cost-
benefit trade-off. Timing and scope constraints prevent an in-depth analysis of each of 
these factors in this document, although some preliminary high-level observations are 
attempted in the next section. In sum, the evaluation framework for each specific reform 
proposal in this document comprises of the following components: 
•  Benefits – in terms of the proposed reform’s impact on efficiency, 
transparency, competition, effective supervision etc. 
•  Risks – in terms of the proposed reform’s failure to adequately address the 
issues and the potential exacerbation of systemic vulnerabilities (extension of 
the safety net), conflicts of interest, regulatory arbitrage etc. 
•  Ease of implementation for regulator/supervisor – in terms of adapting 
regulation and supervision to the proposed reform 
•  Ease of implementation for industry – in terms of the ability to adapt business 
structure and operations to the proposed reform
15 
•  Impact – in terms of the proposed reform’s overall impact (market practices, 
pricing etc.) on the financial system given the size, structure and conduct of 
the sector under consideration. 
 
Proposed reforms are also considered in light of international practice and 
especially the experience of selected peer countries. In particular, specific reforms on 
different legal vehicles and permissible activities are compared and contrasted, where 
applicable, to the financial system structures of Chile, Mexico and Spain (the latter also 
being representative of European Union practice). These three countries were selected as 
appropriate comparators because they share similar legal systems and some of the same 
financial system characteristics as Colombia (e.g. presence of financial conglomerates), 
but are relatively more advanced in terms of size and sophistication.  
 
Five specific and four general reforms to Colombia’s financial system structure 
are proposed in the following section. Each of the former affects (at least) one 
particular type of financial intermediary, while the latter are cross-cutting in the sense 
that they affect – directly or indirectly – all entities that form part of the financial system. 
The likely merits and weaknesses of each reform, based on the aforementioned analytical 
approach, are described below. 
 
B. Specific Reform 1: Financial Leasing 
 
Recommendation: Allow banks to offer financial leasing services directly. Law 
45/1990 qualified leasing companies as financial institutions while maintaining their 
exclusivity in the provision of financial leasing services and authorized banks, CFs and 
CFCs to own them. Law 35/1993 obliged the conversion of leasing companies into credit 
institutions (CFCs) and distinguished between two types of CFCs (ordinary/traditional 
CFCs and CFCs specialized in leasing) depending on the composition of their business; 
                                                 
15 This component does not capture the more subjective issue of the industry’s and/or individual market 
participants’ willingness (as opposed to ability) to adapt to potential reforms.  
  20
the latter measure was eliminated by Law 510/1999. The recommendation here would 
allow banks – in addition to CFCs – to directly offer such services if they so wish
16. 
 
Offering financial leasing directly via banks has become standard international 
practice. For example, Chile has permitted this practice since the late 1990s; as a result, 
many of the leasing companies have been absorbed by their respective group banks and 
the majority of leasing operations are currently provided by the banks themselves. 
Mexico allows the provision of financial leasing both directly by banks and via a separate 
non-bank legal vehicle (“Organizaciones y Actividades Auxiliares de Crédito”) that can 
be owned by a bank, while commercial banks can also offer this product in Spain and 
other EU countries directly or through specialized vehicles. 
 
This recommendation would allow market choice and potentially greater 
efficiencies, although it is not expected to have a large impact on the financial 
system. Such a reform would permit banks to choose whether to offer financial leasing 
directly, while it would allow niche players to continue operating in this market via 
CFCs. Assuming that some leasing-only CFCs currently owned by financial groups are 
subsumed into the group bank, the main benefits of this reform would be greater 
efficiencies
17, potentially greater competition (as other banks enter this market) and direct 
access to lower-cost funding that could reduce product prices. The ease of 
implementation is relatively high for both regulators and the industry. However, the 
potential impact of this reform on the financial system – including the risk from 
extending the bank safety net to cover such activities
18  – is likely to be minimal. 
Although this market has been growing fast in recent years (around 40 percent in 2005), 
it remains fairly small; gross leasing assets were Col$5,240 billion as of end-2005 
(around 8 percent of total loans and leases of credit institutions, or 2 percent of GDP)
19. 
There are around 20 CFCs that are active in leasing, but the market is highly concentrated 
and already dominated by large financial groups (see Table below) – for example, Grupo 
Sindicato and Grupo Aval together control 7 CFCs active in leasing and more than two-
thirds of this market. In fact, all 9 CFCs that are predominantly focused on leasing are 










                                                 
16 Law 795/2003 gave banks the right to directly offer housing leases, but that market remains very small. 
17 These would include operational expense savings related to the elimination of separate external auditors, 
Board of Directors, supervisory reporting, administration (e.g. human resources, legal, compliance) and IT. 
18 CFCs are already subject to many of the same prudential standards as for banks (Law 795/2003 
eliminated any remaining discrepancies), so there should be relatively little impact in moving leasing 
activities from one legal vehicle to another. 
19 See Arbelaez M.A., Villegas F. and Salazar N. (October 2004).  
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Table 8: Size and Ownership of Five Largest Leasing CFCs (December 2005) 
Gross Leasing Assets 
(Col$ billion)
Market Share Ownership
Leasing Colombia 2,321 44% Grupo Sindicato
Leasing de Occidente 890 17% Grupo Aval
Leasing de Credito 643 12% Helm Financial Services
Leasing del Valle 400 8% Grupo Aval
Leasing Bolivar 282 5% Grupo Bolivar
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera and own analysis. 
 
C. Specific Reform 2: Collective Investment Schemes 
 
Recommendation: Introduce a specialized vehicle whose exclusive responsibility 
would be the management of collective investment schemes. These schemes in 
Colombia have historically developed in a fragmented piece-meal manner
20. This led to 
the co-existence of several types of funds subject to different – banking or securities – 
regulations
21  in spite of the common underlying characteristics of this activity
22 (see 
Table and Figure below). The proposed reform would introduce a specialized entity 
operating under international regulatory standards whose mandate would be to 
consolidate and manage such collective investment schemes (i.e. FCO, FCE, FV and 
FI)
23. In addition, this entity could manage FPVs together with AFPs and insurance 
companies
24, as well as those FMIs whose management is sub-contracted to third parties. 
Fiduciarias and comisionistas de bolsa would no longer be allowed to directly manage 
collective investment schemes, but they (as well as banks) could own this specialized 
entity and could agree to distribute its products and/or those of third party providers.  
 
Table 9: Types of Collective Investment Schemes by Provider 
Type of financial institution










Fondos Mutuos de 
Inversión (FMI)
AFPs X
Fiduciarias X X X X
Insurance Companies X
Comisionistas de Bolsa X X
Sociedades Administradoras de Fondos de Inversión (SAFI) X
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera 
                                                 
20 Closed employer/employee-sponsored plans called Fondos Mutuos de Inversión (FMI) were created in 
1959; Sociedades Administradoras de Fondos de Inversión (SAFI) managing Fondos de Inversión (FI) 
were created in 1980; comisionistas de bolsa managing Fondos de Valores (FV) were established in 1990; 
Fondos Comunes Ordinarios (FCO), Fondos Comunes Especiales (FCE) and voluntary pension funds 
(Fondos de Pensiones Voluntarias or FPV) managed by fiduciarias were introduced prior to the 1990’s. 
21 These include, for example, differences in licensing procedures, minimum capital requirements, 
investment limits, internal controls, conduct rules, firewalls in relation to other provider activities etc.  
22 Investment pools related to the social security system and managed by AFPs (i.e. Fondos de Pensiones 
Obligatorios and Fondos de Cesantía) are excluded from the definition of collective investment schemes. 
23 Alternatively, this specialized entity could be based on an amended version of the SAFI, which is a type 
of exclusive fund management firm. 
24 Given its current structure (capped salary contributions with a tax exemption if held for at least 5 years), 
an FPV can also be considered as a type of collective investment scheme with tax benefits.   
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Fiduciarias - FCO Fiduciarias - FCE Fiduciarias - FPV Comisionistas de
Bolsa - FV































Number of Funds Number of Fund Managers Assets under Management (Col$ billion)
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
Note: FPVs managed by AFPs and insurance companies are not included. Many of the same fiduciarias offer FCOs, FCEs and FPVs, 
while the vast majority of fondos mutuos vigilados manage their own investments. 
 
The existence of specialized exclusive vehicles for the management of collective 
investment schemes is standard practice in other countries. For example, all peer 
countries require such schemes to be managed by dedicated vehicles, primarily in order 
to protect the interests of small investors
25. Chile has a legal vehicle for mutual funds 
management (administradora de fondos mutuos) that can be owned by banks, insurance 
companies or brokerage companies. Both Mexico and Spain also have specialized 
vehicles for mutual fund management (sociedad de inversion and sociedad de gestión de 
instituciones de inversión colectiva respectively) that can be owned by banks. 
 










% of GDP  
Source: Investment Company Institute, World Bank, Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
Note: Figures for Colombia include FCO, FCE, FV and FI. 
                                                 
25 For example, IOSCO (1996) states: “It is advisable that the manager of a CIS [Collective Investment 
Scheme] should be prohibited… from conducting any other business than that of a CIS in the CIS or in any 
portfolio. This requirement is necessary to prevent a conflict of interest between the business of the CIS and 
such other business”.  
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The benefits of this recommendation are potentially substantial and could 
encourage further development of this industry. Based on the experience of collective 
investment schemes in other countries, several benefits would arise from bringing the 
management of collective investment schemes ‘under a single roof’:  
•  avoidance of regulatory arbitrage and reduction of conflicts of interest – this is a 
critical consideration given the diverse activities of fiduciarias and comisionistas 
de bolsa (e.g. concurrent management of proprietary portfolio and third party 
funds), the lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for checks-and-
balances and internal controls (e.g. no independent Board of Directors or 
custodians
26), and the concentration of all fund management functions (e.g. 
valuation, registrar services, back office etc.) within each provider 
•  further growth of this industry, whose size still lags other countries (see above 
Figure), via consolidation and greater profesionalization 
•  greater efficiency via scale economies – for example, the median FCO size as of 
end-2005 was about Col$240 billion (equivalent to about US$100 million), while 
the median FCE and FV size was only about Col$36 billion and Col$20 billion 
respectively
27; 
•  more specialization leading to greater professionalization and better management 
of operational risks; 
•  greater market transparency in terms of costs of transactions and services.  
 
However, implementation of this recommendation will not be trivial
28. On the 
regulatory side, important legal and regulatory changes would be necessary in order to 
introduce this reform. A Decree currently under preparation, which aims to greatly 
harmonize and strengthen the regulatory treatment for different types of collective 
investment schemes, would be a useful intermediate step in the reform process; however, 
international experience raises doubts as to whether the Decree can also resolve existing 
conflicts of interest without changes in market structure. On the industry side, collective 
investment schemes account for a significant part of the current business of many 
fiduciarias, which manage around 75 percent of such assets
29, but not of comisionistas de 
bolsa. However, it is worth noting that these entities already organize their investment 
management business distinctly from other activities, while a migration to any new 




                                                 
26 In line with good international practice, custody services should be provided by third parties that are 
independent and unrelated to the fund manager. 
27 Another significant determinant of the current fragmentation and related small average fund size has 
been the strategy of the large financial conglomerates – for example, Grupo Aval controls at least 9 
different entities (fiduciarias and comisionistas de bolsa) that offer collective investment schemes. 
28 An attempt to adopt a similar proposal in 2003 was abandoned after strong industry opposition. 
29 Even though FCOs and FCEs only account on average for 18 percent of total fiduciary assets (“activos 
fideicomitidos”), 40 percent of the fiduciarias’ commissions (equivalent to around one-fourth of total 
revenue) are derived from their management.  
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Table 10: Size and Ownership of Five Largest Collective Investment Scheme 
Providers (December 2005) 
Collective Investments under 
Management (Col$ billion)
Market Share Ownership
Fiducolombia 2,980 17% Grupo Sindicato
Suvalor 1,640 9% Grupo Sindicato
Fiduciaria Davivienda 1,601 9% Grupo Bolivar
Fiduvalle 1,170 7% Grupo Aval
Fiduciaria Bogota 1,090 6% Grupo Aval
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
Note: Collective investments include FCO, FCE, FPVs (only those managed by fiduciarias), FV and FI. Fondos mutuos vigilados are 
excluded. 
 
D. Specific Reform 3: Fiduciary Activities 
 
Recommendation: Allow banks to offer services currently provided by 
fiduciarias, with the exception of collective investment schemes. Law 45/1923 had 
permitted the provision of trust activities directly by banks, but it was not until Law 
45/1990, which obliged the creation of stand-alone companies (fiduciarias), that this type 
of activity grew in importance. Fiduciarias are essentially responsible for 
managing/administering third party trusts/funds (“fideicomisos”)
30 that can be established 
for several reasons
31. The Superintendencia Financiera classifies fiduciary activities into 
the following categories: inversión (FCO, FCE etc.), inmobiliaria (payments and 
collections for construction projects etc.), administración (payments and collections for 
other trusts such as those for inheritance, property, securitizations and restructured loans 
etc.), seguridad social (administration and investments of trusts/funds related to social 
security, including FPV), and garantía y otros (all others, including fiducia en garantía). 
The recommendation would allow banks – in addition to fiduciarias – to directly offer 




Fiduciarias are a relatively rare type of legal vehicle internationally. Even though 
the legal concept of a trust/fiduciary contract exists in other countries, fiduciarias have no 
direct counterparts (including in Chile, Mexico and Spain) and their application and 
                                                 
30 There exist three main types of fiduciary contracts in Colombia: fiducia mercantil (transfer of ownership 
and creation of autonomous trust for funds/goods, which is managed by the fiduciaria on behalf of the 
beneficiary), encargo fiduciario (the fiduciaria administers the funds/goods on behalf of the owner without 
any transfer of ownership or creation of autonomous trust) and fiducia publica (similar to encargo 
fiduciario but involving a public entity). 
31 These include, for example, collective investments (e.g. FCO, FCE) and other investment funds with 
“specific destination” (e.g. public pension funds), securitization vehicles (e.g. for securitizations of 
construction projects, bank loans, or of future cash flows of local/national government), construction / 
property development / infrastructure projects, restructured corporate and municipal loans (Laws 550/1999 
and 617/2000), liquidation of private and public companies, administration of housing subsidies, 
inheritance and life insurance contracts, and collateral trusts (“fiducia en garantía”). 
32 There might also be a few other fiduciaria activities that, based on good international practice, should not 
be provided by the banks – for example, management of securitization special purpose vehicles.  
  25
interpretation are very different. Their activities are instead allocated to different types of 
entities – for example, banks are typically responsible for trust and custody services
33, 
specialized fund management companies are responsible for collective investment 
schemes, while some other activities (e.g. payment of public pensions) are not normally 
associated with financial institutions. However, as can be seen in the Figure below, 
fiduciarias have proved quite successful in Colombia, potentially because they are 
perceived as a relatively efficient response to contract enforcement problems and general 
distrust concerns. 
 

















Inversion Inmobiliarios Administracion Fiducia en Garantia Other Social Security  
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, World Bank, own analysis. 
 
This recommendation would allow market choice and greater efficiencies, but 
conflicts of interest should be addressed via a stronger prudential framework. The 
proposed reform would permit banks to choose whether to offer fiduciary activities 
directly, while it would allow niche players to continue operating in this market via 
fiduciarias. Assuming that some fiduciarias currently owned by financial groups are 
subsumed into the group bank, the main benefit of this reform would be greater 
operational efficiencies (i.e. similar to the leasing recommendation); these have to be 
weighed against the good experience and innovative products of stand-alone fiduciarias 
in recent years, although the final decision should be voluntary/market-driven and not 
imposed by regulation. Smaller banks might also decide to enter this market and provide 
greater competition by offering fiduciary services in-house. These benefits on balance 
likely outweigh the risks of additional conflicts of interest and explicitly extending the 
bank safety net to cover fiduciary activities. In particular, conflicts of interest primarily 
apply to collective investment schemes that are not part of this proposal. Some conflicts 
of interest that already exist
34 could be exacerbated and would need to be addressed via a 
                                                 
33 Mexico allows banks that are unrelated to the loan originating bank to manage the ‘fiducia en garantía’. 
34 Potential conflicts of interest are apparent in the transactions between the fiduciaria and the rest of the 
financial conglomerate. For example, the fiduciaria typically manages the securitization vehicle and the  
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stronger prudential framework
35  - this is a necessary precondition for the successful 
implementation of this recommendation. With respect to extending the safety net, the 
lingering public perception (confirmed in practice during the 2002 mini-crisis) of the 
dependence of fiduciarias on their banks, renders unclear the validity of such a concern
36.  
 
Table 11: Size and Ownership of Five Largest Fiduciarias Excluding Investments 
(December 2005) 
Assets under Management 
(Col$ billion)
Market Share Ownership
Fiducolombia 15,926 26% Grupo Sindicato
Previsora 9,120 15% State-owned
Fidupopular 4,013 6% Grupo Aval
Cititrust 3,999 6% Citigroup
Fiduoccidente 3,823 6% Grupo Aval
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
 
Implementation of this recommendation should not be very difficult for the 
regulator or the industry. On the regulatory side, both bank permissible activities and 
the prudential framework need to be amended appropriately. On the industry side, much 
will depend on how different banks – especially those that belong to the large financial 
groups dominating this market (see Table above) – perceive the relative benefits and 
costs of absorbing their fiduciaria subsidiary
37. However, given the dependence of many 
fiduciarias on their bank parents for many of their activities (e.g. sales, collections, back 
office), it is unlikely that the overall impact on the financial system will be significant. 
 
E. Specific Reform 4: Investment Banking – Banks, CFs and 
Comisionistas de Bolsa 
 
Recommendation A: Allow banks to offer all types of investment banking 
services, with the exception of long-term equity investments in the real sector. Banks 
are currently prohibited from offering such services – i.e. advisory/structuring, securities 
underwriting (except for sovereign debt) and brokerage, and equities trading – which are 
currently provided by CFs and comisionistas de bolsa. This recommendation would allow 
banks to also offer investment banking directly (with the exception of long-term equity 
investments in non-financial companies), but it would let them choose whether to provide 
such services in-house or via a specialized vehicle instead.  
                                                                                                                                                 
fiducias en garantía for loans originated by its group bank, while its ‘sweep account’ services (i.e. overnight 
placement of excess liquidity) for the trusts it manages are often invested in related funds.  
35 These include, for example, stronger corporate governance standards and greater transparency, or even 
the outright prohibition of certain transactions with other financial group entities. 
36 An additional, albeit questionable, risk stems from legal complications (i.e. confusion between third party 
and own funds) that could arise in case of bank insolvency; although this should not be a preoccupation in 
theory, it has been corroborated in practice in some countries. 
37 21 out of 28 fiduciarias, accounting for 80 percent of total fiduciary assets, were controlled by banks as 
of end-2005.  
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The traditional separation between commercial and investment banking is 
fading internationally, although many banks prefer to offer the latter via a stand-
alone securities market vehicle. As can be seen in the Table below, Chilean banks are 
allowed to engage in most investment banking activities, with the exception of trading 
and long-term investments in equity (a carry-over from the associated problems of the 
1982 crisis). Mexican banks are not allowed to underwrite or trade equities, although 
(like in the EU) they can take long-term equity investment positions subject to strict 
concentration, related party and capital adequacy limits. In Spain and other EU countries, 
most investment banking services can be offered directly by banks but it is common 
practice for this type of business to be carried out by a securities subsidiary. However, 
even in such cases, the banks organize their business lines so that they can offer their 
clients the full gamut of investment banking services in an integrated fashion, regardless 
of the different legal vehicles that are performing different roles.  
 














Institutional / High Net Worth asset management X X X X X X X X
Cash management and payments services X X X
Custody X X X X X X X X
Trust / fiduciary services X X X X X X X X
Foreign exchange trading - own account X X X X X X
Derivatives trading - own account X X X X X X X
Sovereign debt underwriting (primary dealers) X X X X X X X
Sovereign debt trading - own account X X X X X X X
Corporate debt underwriting X X X X X X
Corporate debt trading - own account X X X X X X X
Equities underwriting X X X X X X
Equities trading - own account X Only listed stocks X X X
Advisory (M&A, IPOs) and structuring services X X X X X X X
Institutional brokerage (F/X, debt, equity, derivatives) X X X Except equity X X X X
Retail brokerage (F/X, debt, equity, derivatives) F/X and debt X X X X X X
Private equity fund management XXX X
Merchant banking / investments in the real sector X Only listed stocks X X




Source: Own analysis based on information from relevant Superintendencies and Central Banks. 
 
Equity investments in the real sector by Colombian banks should only be 
allowed when a comprehensive framework for consolidated supervision is adopted. 
In other countries (e.g. EU), equity investments in the real sector in the banking book (as 
opposed to the trading book) of banks are often allowed under strict prudential 
requirements. However, investing in real sector companies has historically been 
forbidden to banks (but not CFs) in Colombia. A strong argument can be made that such 
a measure remains necessary given the dominant presence of mixed-activity economic 
groups in Colombia’s financial system, their often complex and non-transparent 
corporate structure, and the lack of a sufficiently comprehensive legal definition of an 
economic group for financial supervision purposes. Unless and until the two latter issues 
are resolved by the adoption of fully comprehensive laws, regulations and supervisory 
procedures (see General Reforms 2 and 4), the risk of extending the safety net to such 
activities by bringing them under the bank would be relatively high and would outweigh 
any potential benefits that could arise. In addition, the forthcoming Basel II Accord 
penalizes banks for such investments (especially for non-listed firms) by assigning them 
higher capital requirements; as a result, banks in other countries have been spinning off 
such activities in separate vehicles such as private equity funds. 
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This recommendation would eliminate some barriers to efficiency and allow 
market choice, at the cost of increasing potential conflicts of interest. There is no 
special reason why banks should not be allowed to provide (at least some types of) 
investment banking services, and bringing those services under “the same roof” would 
create operational synergies. In fact, anecdotal evidence already suggests that most 
comisionistas that belong to banks are relatively smaller since some of their activities are 
instead undertaken by the parent bank itself (e.g. bond trading). In addition, to the extent 
that such a move encourages smaller banks to enter this market, it could also help to 
strengthen competition. The risk stems from the potential extension of the bank safety net 
and the conflicts of interest that could arise if investment banking services are provided 
by the same entity that offers other types of banking services. However, the overall size 
of this market remains small (see next paragraph) while, as described later in the paper 
(see General Reform Issue 2), prevention of conflicts of interests is not guaranteed in 
itself by the formal separation of legal vehicles that belong to the same financial 
conglomerate. This type of risk would be better mitigated by the adoption of strong 
regulations on firewalls that are complemented by effective enforcement – these are 
necessary preconditions for the adoption of this recommendation.  
 
The ease of implementation of this recommendation is moderate, although its 
impact is not likely to be substantial. As far as the authorities are concerned, the 
relevant legal changes are specific and fairly straightforward, but regulation and 
supervision will need to be amended accordingly. From the point of view of the industry, 
the implementation process should not pose significant problems, as financial 
conglomerates that are already providing these services will need to decide whether to 
adopt a different business model for investment banking as part of their broader strategy. 
Although this recommendation might spur the growth of investment banking, it is not 
expected to have an important effect in the short term. There are no available figures for 
the overall size of this industry, but most of the revenue stems from government 
securities trading that is already undertaken by the banks. By contrast, total primary and 
secondary equity and corporate bond issuance has been relatively small in recent years 
(around 20-25 issues annually, half of them by financial institutions). 
 
Recommendation B: Develop a full-fledged investment banking vehicle by 
strengthening Comisionistas de Bolsa and eliminating Corporaciones Financieras. 
There are currently two types of legal vehicles (CFs and comisionistas) that have some 
overlap in their investment banking activities, but each of which in itself does not 
constitute a comprehensive investment banking license. The recommendation would 
allow the creation of the latter by extending the range of permissible activities of 
comisionistas to include those currently undertaken by CFs (for example, merchant 
banking and project/structured finance). The figure of CFs would be eliminated and 
existing ones could be converted into comisionistas or subsumed under the group bank. 
 
There are several ways to achieve a comprehensive investment banking vehicle, 
but market developments suggest that comisionistas are a good starting point. In 
particular, there are numerous options – each with its own pros and cons – of designing a  
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‘pure’ investment bank vehicle starting from the current situation in Colombia
38. In 
practice, however, the relative importance of CFs has decreased substantially over time
39. 
As can be seen in the Tables below, there are only 2 remaining CFs (down from 24 in 
1995) that account for 2 percent of GDP. The bulk of the securities activity is currently 
shared between banks (mainly sovereign debt) and comisionistas (equities and corporate 
debt).  
 




Corfivalle 4,986 93% Grupo Aval
Colcorp 401 7% Grupo Sindicato
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
 




Interbolsa 140 18% Independent
Inversionistas de Colombia 77 10% Independent
Correval 71 9% Independent
Suvalor 64 8% Grupo Sindicato
Alianza 59 7% Independent
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
Note: Size is based on annual equity and debt turnover (both for third parties and for own account) for 2005. 
 
In addition to eliminating the figure of CFs, this recommendation would 
necessitate the regulatory revision and upgrading of comisionistas de bolsa. In 
practice, comisionistas actually have three different levels of license, each with its own 
range of permissible activities (brokerage only, broker-dealer, broker-dealer plus foreign 
exchange intermediation) and related minimum regulatory capital level. Incorporating 
some of the aforementioned additional permissible activities will likely require a revision 
of the current three-level arrangement and stronger overall prudential requirements
40. In 
addition, there might be a need to differentiate their names in order for the public to 
clearly distinguish among the different license levels – for example, by calling them 
comisionistas de bolsa versus sociedades de bolsa versus sociedades de valores. 
 
                                                 
38 These include, for example, extending permissible activities of CFs and reducing those of comisionistas 
to brokerage; extending permissible activities of CFs and comisionistas so that both of them could provide 
investment banking services; and creating an entirely new figure for investment banking, thereby 
eliminating the need for CFs and reducing comisionistas to brokerage. 
39 The CFs have not been helped by their historical emphasis on long-term financial intermediation 
(originally funded by international financial institutions) that is now unprofitable because of the lack of 
access to cheap funding. 
40 These would build upon the 2003 reforms introduced by the SV, which strengthened regulatory capital 
requirements and upgraded the required professional capacity (including risk controls) of comisionistas.  
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The practice in other countries varies widely on this issue, but such vehicles are 
generally more closely aligned to the figure of comisionista de bolsa. As can be seen 
in Table 11 above, both Chile and Spain have two types of securities firms (partly for 
historical reasons) while Mexico only has casas de bolsa. However, it is worth noting 
that the firms in all three countries (and the EU) are much closer to securities markets 
than to financial intermediation, being in this sense like comisionistas rather than CFs. 
 
There are several benefits to having a full-fledged ‘pure’ investment bank, but 
neither the ease of implementation nor the overall impact is likely to be high, at least 
in the short term. Potential benefits include a more credible and visible investment 
banking figure that could help stimulate the market, and potentially greater competition. 
With respect to risks, care should be taken for a smooth exit process for CFs and 
upgrading procedure for comisionistas, as well as to ensure that there will be no 
regulatory arbitrage between banks and comisionistas when undertaking similar 
investment banking activities. Implementation will likely not be easy for the authorities 
and the industry, since the recommendation requires a substantial revision of the current 
framework. Given the aforementioned size and allocation of the investment banking 
‘pie’, its overall impact would likely remain relatively small in the short term.  
 
Recommendation C: Allow all credit institutions to finance the acquisition of 
real sector companies, subject to standard prudential requirements and credit 
procedures. For historical reasons, such debt financing is forbidden to banks (article 72 
of the EOSF and Carta Circular 143/2003), and it is even considered an offence in the 
Criminal Code (article 316). This recommendation would align Colombia to the practice 
in other countries by permitting acquisition financing and subjecting it to standard 
prudential requirements (large exposures, capital adequacy rules etc.) and credit 
assessment policies and procedures. 
 
The reform would stimulate corporate acquisition activity and level the playing 
field across banks, although it requires amending high-rank regulations. In 
particular, increased financing possibilities could encourage the development of a more 
active domestic corporate acquisitions market (such a market is currently very small and 
hence the short-term impact would be minimal). It would also help domestic banks that 
are currently at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign banks, because the latter can 
finance acquisitions of real sector companies offshore. With respect to risks, there is a 
perception that the reform could encourage financial speculation, but the presence of 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory practices (which did not exist in the past) 
mitigates such a concern. Implementation should not pose significant problems for the 
industry or for supervisors, although it requires the amendment of high-rank regulations 
like the EOSF and the Criminal Code.  
 
F. Specific Reform 5: Sociedades de Capitalización 
 
Recommendation: Eliminate the vehicle of Sociedades de Capitalización. 
Sociedades de capitalización were created by law 66/1947 and were a popular form of  
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financial savings prior to the 1990s. A client investing in “títulos/cedulas de 
capitalización” would essentially be required to open an account for at least one year in 
exchange for participation in periodic lotteries in which he could gain a multiple of his 
own contributions to the account, as well as the opportunity to borrow against those 
“títulos” and to receive a (low) return for his investment. The sociedades de 
capitalización would in turn invest these funds in debt and equity securities, subject to the 
same investment regime as insurance companies. The recommendation would eliminate 
this type of vehicle by obliging existing firms to convert themselves into (or be absorbed 
by) other types of financial intermediaries. 
 




Bolivar 493 33% Grupo Bolivar
Capitalizadora Colpatria 419 28% Mercantil Colpatria
Cedulas Colon de Cap. Colseguros 275 18% Allianz
Capitalizadora Suramericana 258 17% Grupo Sindicato
Capitalizadora Colmena 62 4% Fundacion Social
 
Source: Superintendencia Financiera, own analysis. 
 
The perceived benefits of this recommendation outweigh the costs, although the 
impact on the financial system is very small. In particular, sociedades de capitalización 
are an inefficient vehicle for savings given their low absolute returns (often negative in 
real terms); the existence of the lottery mechanism has been their biggest attraction. Their 
elimination would permit the channeling of those resources to the banking sector, 
although there is a minor risk that the relevant population segment (lower- to middle-
income) might instead decide to marginally reduce its financial savings if they are not 
offered financial products that they consider attractive. However, the lack of flexibility 
and product innovation, combined with the development of more efficient instruments by 
the financial system, has already led to the progressive decline of these entities and few 
inflows of new business. As can be seen in the above Table, there are currently five 
sociedades de capitalización whose total assets amount to around Col$1,500 billion or 
US$650 million (0.5 percent of GDP or 1.7 percent of bank deposits). Implementation of 
this recommendation would be relatively easy for regulators given their small size and 
relative ‘isolation’ with the rest of the financial system
41, while a carefully managed 
transition path for existing client contracts (some of which are set to expire within 8-9 
years) would facilitate the exit process of these entities.  
 
G. General Reform 1: Legal Framework 
 
Recommendation: Review and revise the legal framework for the financial 
system in terms of hierarchy, consistency and breadth of coverage. A reform effort to 
                                                 
41 In fact, two of the five companies are apparently in the process of exiting the industry.  
  32
rationalize and simplify the legal framework began in 1990 with the creation of the 
EOSF, but the desired objectives were not fully met for a variety of reasons (see below). 
 
There is a significant difference in Colombia between theory and practice in the 
legal concept of vertical hierarchy. Colombia, like other countries following the 
Continental or Napoleonic model, has a legal framework based on written law and a clear 
vertical hierarchy between different types of regulations
42. This legal concept has two 
main implications: a lower-rank regulation cannot contravene higher rank regulations, but 
can only complement them on a more detailed or specific basis; and a subject must be 
regulated according to its relative importance, both in terms of the procedures and the 
bodies issuing it. However, even though the system is theoretically clear and effective, 
practice can be a different issue. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a common problem is 
that lower-rank regulations can ‘over-interpret’ higher-rank ones, thereby usurping or 
misappropriating legal powers and creating legal uncertainty that can only be resolved 
following strict and lengthy court procedures. The opposite case is also true, whereby 
higher-rank regulations (such as, for example, the ones found in the EOSF) get into too 
much detail and thereby ‘invade’ the scope of lower-rank ones. Although this latter issue 
should not be a major problem in theory, it can be quite important in practical terms 
because it complicates the task of updating regulations to financial system developments 
since it requires longer procedures and the approval of higher bodies (e.g. Congress). 
 
Although the EOSF was devised as a legal mechanism to clarify and give 
consistency to the financial regulatory framework, it suffers from complexity and 
lack of a clear structure. The EOSF was issued in the form of Decree 663/1993
43, and 
its intention was to systematically condense existing financial system regulations into a 
single body. Given the way it was produced, the EOSF has the rank of a law (in technical 
terms, the name is “Decreto-Ley”) and all reforms to it must therefore be made by 
Congress, as the faculties given to the President were on an extraordinary and specific 
time basis. However, the EOSF essentially put together existing regulations 
(“recopilación”) rather than analytically create new ones based on existing regulatory 
principles and objectives (“compilación”). As a result, the EOSF is actually comprised of 
very different regulations with unclear structure, not only in terms of the regulated issues 
but also in terms of the different legal ranks that should be used for different subjects and 
levels of detail and importance. This has impeded legal certainty and a clear 
understanding of the “rules of the game” by market participants
44 and sometimes even by 
regulators. In addition, updating the EOSF has become an increasingly complex and 
lengthy process even for minor adaptations, given the excessive detail of many of the 
regulations contained in it. This could create situations of legal obsolescence and 
regulatory gaps, where market participants assume legal risk if they undertake what they 
should be allowed to do or where regulators do not have the appropriate legal instruments 
                                                 
42 The Constitution forms the supreme regulation and establishes the master lines of the legal system; these 
are further developed by Laws, which are in turn put into practice through Decrees; finally, the Decrees are 
operationalized via Resolutions, Circulars and Instructions. 
43 Congress extraordinarily authorized the President of the Republic via Law 45/1990 to issue the EOSF. 
44 Anecdotal evidence suggests that different market participants interpret the same regulation differently –
for example, the concept of “delegación de profesionalidad”.   
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to perform their functions. The problems surrounding the EOSF are progressively 
becoming worse as the volume of regulations increases – particularly with the 
forthcoming incorporation of securities markets law as a result of the merger of the two 
Superintendencies – and changes to them are prepared on a piece-meal basis. 
 
Practical and tested solutions to this problem can be found in other countries 
with a similar legal model. In particular, the most common and effective response 
would be to organize a real compilation process (“compilación”) where the different 
issues to be regulated can be considered in a structured manner. This implies the creation 
of so-called financial “Ley Marco” or “Ley de Bases”, whereby only the general 
principles are stated, and are accompanied by Decrees, Resolutions and Circulars with the 
required detail at each level. This regulatory package should be addressed in a uniform 
and orderly way to ensure that no inconsistencies are produced. An analytical exercise 
should be undertaken prior to this process in order to validate the need for this reform and 
to detect the main inconsistencies.  
 
The implementation of this reform is difficult and fraught with risks, but it is 
clearly beneficial and any further delays would merely exacerbate the magnitude of 
the problem. Greater legal certainty and understanding by market participants, as well as 
faster and better updating of the legal framework to economic and financial changes 
going forward, are the main benefits of this recommendation. Possible risks stem from a 
revision process that is not well controlled, thereby resulting in unwanted changes to the 
substance (as opposed to the form) of regulation. However, this is likely the right time to 
undertake this exercise: the creation of the new Superintendencia Financiera obliges the 
inclusion of securities markets-related regulation in the EOSF, while any further delays 
would merely exacerbate the magnitude of the problems. Given its complex nature, 
implementation is likely to be difficult for regulators and supervisors
45; by contrast, the 
implementation effort by the industry would be much easier. Finally, while there should 
in theory be no direct impact on the financial system in terms of substance, improving 
legal certainty / understanding and allowing a smoother legal updating process would be 
an important benefit of this recommendation. 
 
H. General Reform 2: Prevention of Conflicts of Interest 
 
Recommendation: Review, revise and clarify the existing legal and regulatory 
framework for the prevention of conflicts of interest. This can be achieved by 
reviewing and amending, as necessary, existing firewalls (e.g. exposure limits, “chinese 
walls”, Board of Directors participation etc.) and shared activities within a financial firm 
and – in the case of financial conglomerates – between different group companies (e.g. 
common front office, infrastructure, client databases etc.). 
 
Although formal separation of activities across and within firms can help to 
reduce conflicts of interest, this measure by itself is not enough. Historically, one of 
                                                 
45 The creation of a Technical Legal Team would likely be necessary, whose objective would be to 
restructure the current regulations but not amend their content (unless required by other proposed reforms).  
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the main reasons for developing Colombia’s financial system based on separated, 
specialized legal vehicles has been the prevention of conflicts of interest. However, 
experience (including the 1998-99 crisis and the mini-2002 TES crisis) has shown that 
this approach is more formal than substantial, especially with the development of 
financial conglomerates under a common control and decision-making process. 
Regulations for the prevention of conflicts of interest cannot therefore be primarily based 
on formal criteria like the separation of businesses between companies and the 
appointment of different professionals for each one, but rather via an adequate set of 
relevant regulations. 
 
In the case of Colombia, there are two major problems with regulations covering 
conflicts of interest. Firstly, such regulations (as recorded in the EOSF) appear 
fragmentary, with varying levels of detail depending on the type of financial institution, 
and do not fully address all the relevant issues of substance (e.g. “Chinese walls” between 
certain activities within institutions, sharing of client databases across institutions, nature 
of prudential framework and supervisory responsibilities vis-à-vis outsourcing providers 
etc.). Secondly, anecdotal evidence suggests that the understanding and interpretation of 
these regulations differs across individuals and companies, resulting in the adoption of 
different policies – for example, the extent to which certain services (e.g. Treasury, legal, 
accounting etc.) can be shared across financial entities of the same group via Service 
Level Agreements and under what conditions. 
 
Good international practice points to the development of regulations that clearly 
lay out a set of general principles covering the prevention of conflicts of interest. 
This would require regulations formulating general principles regarding the prevention of 
conflicts of interest, with clear rules about which activities and conduct can be considered 
permissible and how. A substance-over-form principle should be applied in this context 
in order to avoid excessively formal, over-detailed or incomplete approaches. A different 
but related issue that should also be clarified in this process is the one related to 
outsourcing and the delegation of responsibilities (“delegación de profesionalidad”), 
which is based on the idea that there exist ‘core’ financial activities that cannot be 
transferred / delegated to other companies as that would imply the transfer of 
authorization for that activity. In the case of Colombia, such activities currently include 
fund management, which therefore has to be undertaken in-house. The two issues are 
related in case where outsourcing is conducted between companies of the same financial 
conglomerate, where existing conflicts of interest can be exacerbated. 
  
It has also become good international practice to promote self-regulation by 
companies and groups in a context of transparency and public disclosure. The 
prevention of conflicts of interest cannot be based exclusively on external regulations, but 
must also provide market-based incentives for financial companies and groups to 
establish and enforce their own codes of conduct, allowing more detailed rules to be 
formulated that adjust the external general principles to the specific circumstances of 
each case. Transparency and public disclosure of these codes of conduct can be very 
helpful in order to convince market participants and the general public that conflicts of 
interest are effectively and professionally addressed.  
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While the benefits of this recommendation are clear, the implementation process 
will not be easy. In particular, a detailed review and revision of existing regulations on 
this topic is required, which would in turn lead to changes in the way that the industry 
operates. However, greater legal certainty, transparency and understanding by market 
participants will ensure the consistent application of rules, potentially allow greater 
operational efficiencies (depending on the extent that outsourcing is allowed) and help to 
mitigate conflicts of interest. Potential risks include a revised framework that remains 
formalistic, leaves important gaps or is not properly enforced. Although a significant 
direct impact on the financial system as a result of this recommendation is not expected, 
greater market integrity and consistency in the application of the rules can have a 
potentially important indirect positive effect. 
 
I. General Reform 3: Financial System ‘Perimeter’ 
 
Recommendation: Review and revise the regulations defining reserved financial 
activities that are subject to supervision and the entities that could perform them. 
Colombian regulations consider reserved financial activities to be those that only 
authorized financial institutions are allowed to perform. However, these activities are 
defined narrowly, thereby leaving room for non-financial institutions to offer potentially 
similar activities that are not regulated. This recommendation would revise and broaden 
the definition to ensure consistency and appropriateness of reserved financial activities. 
 
The current definition of ‘reserved’ financial activities in Colombia is 
fragmented across different types and hierarchies of regulation. The main ones are: 
•  article 335 of the Constitution (“Constitución Política de Colombia”), which 
states that financial, insurance and exchange market-related activities related 
to the collection and use of general public financial resources are considered 
of public interest and, as such, subject to previous public authorization; 
•  article 316 of the Criminal Code, which addresses the situation when public  
deposits are collected without being administratively authorized; 
•  articles 108 and 109 of the EOSF, which prohibit individuals and companies 
to perform activities that are exclusive to authorised financial institutions, to 
advertise as financial companies without having been authorised as such, and 
to use the term “ahorros” (savings); 
•  Decree 1997/88, which prohibits the use of names of financial authorised 
institutions to other companies. 
 
As can be deduced, the definition of the financial system is mainly based on the 
authorized institutions that form it and on the exclusiveness of the narrowly defined 
activities that they undertake. This implies that the system does not have very clear 
borders, and there are practical examples where commercial, non-financially supervised 
companies are performing activities that could be considered (partly or exclusively) the 
prerogative of regulated financial institutions. Some of the main examples include:  
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•  “consorcios comerciales” / “autofinancieras” – these companies, which are 
made up of a few partners, collect funds from the general public in order to 
finance their car purchases; 
•  “cooperativas de ahorro y crédito” – these companies are fairly similar in 
terms of their activities to regulated financial cooperatives; 
•  funeral homes and other companies are offering “planes exequiales” (burial 
plans), which represents a form of an insurance contract that is also offered by 
regulated insurance companies; 
•  “afianzadoras” and other companies are offering “seguros de arrendamiento” 
(guarantee of rent payments for office rental), which represents a form of an 
insurance contract that is also offered by regulated insurance companies; 
•  “cambistas” (individual foreign exchange brokers) handle foreign exchange 
intermediation and remittances and are supposedly registered with the 
authorities, but they perform similar activities to regulated “casas de cambio”. 
It is worth noting that some of these companies are supervised by non-financial 
government bodies (e.g. “Superintendencia de Sociedades” and “Superintendencia de 
Economía Solidaria”) under a different set of rules and regulations. At the same time, 
there are also companies that have been historically subject to financial regulation and 
supervision with relatively little justification, such as bond warehouses (“Almacenes 
Generales de Depósito”) and insurance and reinsurance brokers. 
 
There are at least three main problems stemming from an unclear financial 
system ‘perimeter’. Firstly, there is the potential for the financial activities of 
unregulated companies to pose risks to the financial system and undermine financial 
stability; this is an important consideration, particularly given that the general public is 
unaware of such risks. Secondly, scarce supervisory resources are allocated to companies 
currently within the ‘perimeter’ for little apparent reason, which is a case of over-
regulation/supervision. Thirdly, there can be unfair competition between commercial 
companies and financially regulated companies that are subject to onerous prudential 
requirements, which introduces markets distortions and perverse incentives.  
 
The recommendation seeks to better clarify the ‘perimeter’ of the financial 
system. As in other countries, this would involve describing more generally the type of 
activities that should be considered as exclusive and subject to financial authorization and 
supervision, irrespective of the specific names and descriptions used. Financial 
institutions should also be defined on this basis, specifying for each of them the statutory 
characteristics and type of permissible activities they can perform. In order to achieve this 
objective, legislation needs to be in place that clearly states the rules at the required level 
(i.e. Law for the main principles, and Decrees, Resolutions and Circulars for the 
necessary technical details and instructions) without gaps or ambiguities that could be 
used to distort the playing field. Effective sanctions and disciplinary measures should 
also be in place to ensure enforcement and compliance with the regulations, including for 
any identified illegal financial practices. In the case of Colombia, maintaining a so-called 
‘para-financial system’ could also be feasible and potentially desirable. This refers to 
situations where certain activities and companies have some financial components, but 
are not enough in type or importance to classify them within the ‘perimeter’ in a strict  
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sense. These companies could be subject to minimal relevant regulation and supervision, 
but this would be delegated by agreement to other government supervisory bodies. Clear 
and effective regulations and coordination procedures across supervisors would need to 
be in place for this arrangement to succeed.  
 
The perceived benefits of this reform exceed the likely risks, but implementation 
will not be easy. The main benefits would be the promotion of financial stability, 
reduction in regulatory arbitrage and unfair competition, and increased protection of 
financial system users. The main risk would be the implementation of an inadequate or 
excessively formalistic or burdensome regulatory framework, which could create new 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage or introduce additional and unnecessary supervisory 
burden. Due care should be taken in this sense of the legal hierarchy in order to avoid 
introducing in the law any interpretation criteria or detailed rules that should be part of 
lower-ranked regulations. Implementation of this reform by regulators and supervisors 
will likely not be easy given the technical requirements and based on international 
experience
46, while the implementation needs and related impact on the industry (market 
practices, pricing etc.) – while positive – are difficult to estimate a priori since they 
greatly differ by type of financial activity and/or company. 
 
J. General Reform 4: Financial Conglomerates 
 
Recommendation A: Give financial supervisors the right to presume whether a 
company is related to a financial group. This reform would address existing legal gaps 
that hamper the comprehensive supervision of mixed-activity financial conglomerates 
(see below). It would imply a more effective approach that gives supervisors the right to 
presume “iuris tantum” under certain broad criteria whether (financial or non-financial) 
companies form part of the same financial conglomerate, thereby shifting the onus of 
proof to the group itself.  
 
Colombia does not have a sufficiently comprehensive legal definition of an 
economic group for financial supervision purposes, which creates potentially 
important systemic risks. The legal definition of an economic group, which is based on 
the Commercial Code (as amended by Law 222/1995) and supporting secondary 
regulation
47 , allows the Superintendencia Financiera to categorize financial 
conglomerates and require their consolidation for certain reporting and prudential 
                                                 
46 The case of the European Union could be illustrative and helpful in this sense, since significant efforts 
had to be made in order to build the Single Market and create the European Financial Passport from a 
starting point of different financial systems, concepts and institutions. 
47 For example, Decree 2360/1993 (credit limits with related parties), Decree 2649/1993 (accounting rules), 
Circular 100/1995 (main accounting and financial requirements for credit institutions), Superintendencia de 
Sociedades Circular 030/1997 (reporting and prudential requirements for economic groups), 
Superintendencia de Valores Circular 002/1998 (consolidated accounting and financial disclosure by 
registered securities issuers), Decree 1720/2001 (minimum capital adequacy ratios) and Law 795/2003 
(monitoring and on-site supervision of entities that are not under the direct control of the Superintendencia 
Bancaria but meet the presumptions required for consolidation).  
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purposes
48. However, there remain important legal gaps covering the definition of a 
financial conglomerate (i.e. presumption of subordination or ‘dominant influence’) and 
the scope and conduct of consolidated supervision (e.g. development of a comprehensive 
and consistent risk assessment methodology) that do not allow supervisors to fully 
‘capture’ an economic group.  For example, in cases where shareholdings are below 50 
percent but there is presumption of subordination, commonality of purpose and 
management must be proved for a company to be deemed to belong to an economic 
group. A narrow interpretation of this rule has historically allowed the two main 
economic groups to argue successfully that certain companies do not form part of them, 
impeding the supervisor from ‘capturing’ the entire group
49. This exposes the financial 
system to vulnerabilities stemming from the presence of financial conglomerates that are 
not adequately addressed by financial regulation and supervision
50. 
 
International experience shows that supervisors must be empowered with a set 
of legal presumptions in order to be able to effectively determine a financial 
conglomerate’s perimeter. Experience has shown that commercial legal frameworks for 
economic groups tend to be insufficient to address financial conglomerates given their 
complexity and importance. In particular, the emphasis of financial supervisors is not 
solely on knowledge of the ultimate conglomerate controller(s), but also on the 
relationships and inter-dependence between group companies in order to understand 
group-level sources and levels of risk and solvency. As such, some countries have 
adopted specific regulations for the determination of financial conglomerates that 
supersede Commercial Code rules (for example, Chile
51 and Spain). Moreover, financial 
supervisors have been progressively entitled to presume links between companies in 
terms of control and influence, giving them the power to define the perimeter of the 
financial group and thereby shift the burden of proof. 
 
Recommendation B: Introduce legislation that would inhibit authorization for 
complex and/or non-transparent financial group structures which cannot be 
supervised properly. This recommendation would introduce a regulation that permits 
the supervisory authorities to reject or withdraw the license of those financial institutions 
that form part of a financial group that is impossible to supervise effectively because of 
having a complex and/or non-transparent corporate structure based on specific criteria 
that would need to be determined.  
 
                                                 
48 These requirements do not include consolidated minimum capital adequacy requirements for the entire 
group, which currently apply at the level of individual credit institutions and the bank holding company. 
49 For example, Grupo Aval currently consolidates its financial sector activities under 3 different financial 
groups for supervisory purposes (i.e. Banco de Bogota, Banco Popular and Banco de Occidente). 
50 A typology of vulnerabilities created by the presence of financial conglomerates in a financial system can 
be found in Joint Forum publications and in Stephanou C. (March 2005). These include excessive leverage 
or multiple gearing, inconsistent regulatory treatment and incomplete coverage, financial and psychological 
contagion, and distorted competition. 
51 Article 84 of the General Banking Act in Chile states: “Corresponderá a la Superintendencia determinar, 
mediante normas generales, las personas naturales o jurídicas que deban considerarse vinculadas a la 
propiedad o gestión del banco… El hecho de que sea deudora de un banco una sociedad constituida en el 
extranjero, entre cuyos socios o accionistas figuren otras sociedades o cuyas acciones sean al portador, 
hará presumir que se encuentra vinculada para los efectos de este número”.  
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Consolidated supervision in Colombia is hindered by the complex and non-
transparent corporate structures of some domestic mixed-activity financial groups. 
The historical rationale for mixing commercial and financial companies (e.g. benefits of 
intra-group financing and vertical integration etc.), the need for multiple institutional 
vehicles to undertake different activities, the restrictions on equity investments for certain 
financial institutions and other reasons (e.g. tax, security, control) have encouraged the 
proliferation of complex organizational structures. As can be seen in the Figure above, 
these tend to include several holding companies controlled via ‘shell’ investment vehicles 
(often offshore) by their ultimate owner(s). Banking- and securities-related activities tend 
to be concentrated under the bank holding company, while other financial (especially 
insurance) and real sector activities are provided through holdings above and/or parallel 
to the bank. The corporate structures differ among Colombia’s largest financial 
conglomerates, ranging from a single holding company for all financial institutions of an 
economic group (e.g. Grupo Sindicato) to a more complex pyramidal structure of 
investment cross-holdings (e.g. Grupo Aval). There is currently no regulatory 
requirement for the creation of a separate financial holding company that would assemble 
together the different financial institutions of mixed-activity economic groups. 
 
International experience has shown that financial supervisors must be 
empowered to reject structures that are difficult to supervise effectively. Group 
structures can be very complex for a variety of reasons, ranging from pure market and 
technical considerations to the relative unwillingness by certain groups to fully disclose 
their real situation. While the aforementioned market orientation principle would permit a 
variety of corporate structures, supervisors are responsible by law to effectively supervise 






































































their role. For example, following the BCCI crisis, EU regulators have introduced a law 
that allows supervisory authorities to reject or withdraw the license of those financial 
institutions that form part of a financial group that is impossible to supervise effectively 
because of having a complex and/or non-transparent corporate structure
52. 
 
Both reform proposals would greatly facilitate effective supervision of mixed-
activity financial conglomerates, although implementation will not be easy. The main 
benefit would be greater transparency of financial conglomerate structures, allowing a 
more effective application of existing prudential requirements (e.g. large exposures, 
related party lending, capital adequacy etc.) and understanding of the systemic risks and 
impact on the bank safety net. The main risk of the proposed reforms is related to over-
regulation, i.e. if supervisors exert their powers in a too subjective or intrusive manner. 
Even though there is currently a need to fully develop appropriate processes, information 
systems and procedures for consolidated supervision by the Superintendencia Financiera, 
implementation of the proposed reforms would help rather than hinder such efforts. There 
are theoretically no implementation considerations for the industry (but likely strong 
resistance from the affected parties). Although the proposed reforms’ impact on 
efficiency is uncertain depending on how groups respond by changing their corporate 
structure, its main impact would likely be reduced systemic risk stemming from better 
transparency and disclosure of financial conglomerates. 
 
Implementation of these reforms would also pave the way for a more flexible 
structure of financial groups. In particular, current regulations allow insurance 
companies to own banks (but not vice versa), and banks to control comisionistas, 
fiduciarias, CFCs and CFs (but not vice versa). A more level playing field would allow 
greater market choice and the proliferation of different organizational structures, which 
could potentially increase efficiency. However, this asymmetry in regulatory treatment 
should only be lifted once existing problems with the current structure are addressed, i.e. 
when the perimeter of financial conglomerates is well-defined and effective consolidated 
supervision is adopted. 
                                                 
52 EU Directive 2000/12/CE, which incorporates the previous legislation on this topic, states: “Los Estados 
miembros pueden, además, denegar o retirar la autorización bancaria cuando consideren que la estructura 
del grupo es inadecuada para el ejercicio de las actividades bancarias, en particular, porque éstas no 
podrían supervisarse de forma satisfactoria. Las autoridades competentes disponen, a este efecto, de los 
poderes señalados en el párrafo… con vistas a garantizar una gestión saneada y prudente de las entidades 
de crédito… Cuando existan vínculos estrechos entre la entidad de crédito y otras personas físicas o 
jurídicas, las autoridades competentes concederán la autorización únicamente si dichos vínculos no 
obstaculizan el buen ejercicio de su misión de supervisión. Las autoridades competentes también 
denegarán la autorización cuando el buen ejercicio de su misión de supervisión se vea obstaculizado por 
las disposiciones legales, reglamentarias o administrativas del Derecho de un tercer país, aplicables a una 
o varias de las personas físicas o jurídicas con las que la entidad de crédito mantenga vínculos estrechos, 
o por problemas relacionados con su aplicación”.  
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IV.  Conclusions and Proposed Roadmap 
A. Conclusions 
 
The main messages stemming from an analysis of the legal and regulatory 
framework and characteristics of the Colombian financial system are:   
•  The financial system had historically developed under a model of specialized 
‘vehicles’ subject to severe restrictions on permissible activities 
•  Law 45/1990 converted the system into one of “multi-banking” (matrix-
subsidiaries) and promoted the creation of financial conglomerates  
•  Legal reforms during the last 15 years have provided more flexibility but have 
not significantly changed the overall picture  
•  The current model is already de facto close to universal banking because of 
the presence of financial conglomerates, although it is more inefficient 
because their structures are not fully market-determined 
•  There has been a significant decline in the number of financial institutions 
over the last 10 years, which has been accompanied by an increase in the 
relative importance of institutional investors and capital markets 
•  The banking sector has mostly recovered from the 1999 financial crisis, 
although financial intermediation has been slow to pick up 
•  Two domestic mixed-activity economic groups (Grupo Aval and Grupo 
Sindicato) control the largest financial conglomerates and currently account 
for half of total bank assets 
•  Financial conglomerates are already leveraging many operational synergies, 
and this is expected to increase given the on-going consolidation process. 
 
The analytical approach developed in this paper has yielded the following 
recommendations: 
 
Table 16: Summary of Proposed Recommendations 
1 Allow banks to offer financial leasing services directly
2
Introduce a specialized vehicle whose exclusive responsibility would be the management of 
collective investment schemes
3
Allow banks to offer services currently provided by fiduciarias, with the exception of collective 
investment schemes
4A
Allow banks to offer all types of investment banking services, with the exception of long-term equity 
investments in the real sector
4B
Develop a full-fledged investment banking vehicle by strengthening Comisionistas de Bolsa and 
eliminating Corporaciones Financieras
4C
Allow all credit institutions to finance the acquisition of real sector companies, subject to standard 
prudential requirements and credit procedures
5 Eliminate the vehicle of Sociedades de Capitalización
1
Review and revise the legal framework for the financial system in terms of hierarchy, consistency 
and breadth of coverage
2
Review, revise and clarify the existing legal and regulatory framework for the prevention of conflicts 
of interest
3
Review and revise the regulations defining reserved financial activities that are subject to 
supervision and the entities that could perform them
4A Give financial supervisors the right to presume whether a company is related to a financial group
4B
Introduce legislation that would inhibit authorization for complex and/or non-transparent financial 








The motivations underlying the specific recommendations can be conceptually 
classified into three main types. These are:  
•  Exclusivity – the current legal and regulatory framework unnecessarily 
restricts a financial activity to a non-bank vehicle – for example, leasing 
(CFCs), fiduciary activities (fiduciaria) and investment banking (CFs and 
comisionistas) – or prohibits it altogether (e.g. acquisition financing) 
•  Fragmentation – the current legal and regulatory framework leads to the 
improper fragmentation of a financial activity across different vehicles that 
operate in distinct market segments and are subject to different regulations, 
such as the management of collective investment schemes (comisionistas and 
fiduciarias) and investment banking (CFs and comisionistas) 
•  Obsolescence – the historical rationale for the existence of certain vehicles is 
no longer valid given recent market developments, as is the case for CFs and 
sociedades de capitalización. 
Even though the latter motivation (obsolescence) is probably less important than the first 
two motivations (exclusivity and fragmentation) in terms of priority and market impact, it 




Proposed recommendations would promote a more sound, transparent and 
market-oriented financial system, but their overall impact on the system’s efficiency 
is likely to be moderate. Specific reforms would allow a more market-oriented financial 
structure, but are unlikely to lead to fundamental organizational changes within financial 
conglomerates that would significantly affect system-level efficiency. However, the 
reforms would encourage competition by smaller-sized players in niche segments (e.g. 
capital markets, asset management, fiduciarias) that rely on specialized vehicles with less 
onerous prudential requirements than banks, as well as by small banks that no longer 
need to maintain specialized vehicles to provide a broader range of financial services. 
General reforms might also contribute to greater operational efficiencies, but their overall 
impact is primarily on risk mitigation and would take longer to implement. Regulatory 
arbitrage, conflicts of interest and unfair competition would be significantly reduced, 
while legal certainty would be substantially  improved. The effective supervision of 
financial conglomerates would enable better understanding of systemic risks that, in 
combination with more effective controls and with regulatory clarifications on 
permissible activities (including on the types of activities that can be shared/outsourced), 
would produce a more transparent, market-oriented and sound financial system. 
 
B. Implications for Supervision  
 
The proposed reforms would not change current supervisory priorities but 
would strengthen consolidated supervision of financial groups. The recent merger of 
                                                 
53 For example, sociedades de capitalización are effectively competing with banks in financial savings 
intermediation and – in order to ensure a level playing field – should adjust their prudential and accounting 
framework accordingly.  
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the two financial supervisors supports a more comprehensive and integrated outlook on 
financial regulation and supervision, which is needed in order to effectively address the 
dominant presence of financial conglomerates in the system. This is addressed both 
directly by the proposed reform on financial conglomerates, and indirectly by other 
proposed reforms (for example, prevention of potential conflicts of interest). Certain 
specific reforms add to the supervisory workload (e.g. investment banking and collective 
investment schemes), others potentially diminish it (e.g. elimination of CFs and 
sociedades de capitalización), while the effect is unclear for some others (e.g. changes to 
the financial system ‘perimeter’). However, most reforms require new regulations and 
procedures that will take time to be developed, implemented and enforced. For example, 
if the proposed recommendations are adopted, it is likely that a review of minimum start-
up capital by type of financial vehicle and of minimum capital adequacy requirements by 
type of financial activity would be required. 
 
C. Implications for Competition 
 
The proposed reforms would likely make even more imperative the need for a 
clear antitrust policy governing the financial system. A comprehensive antitrust policy 
needs to be in place in light of existing economic realities and the on-going consolidation 
and privatization process, particularly as – given the proposed recommendations – the 
framework under which financial conglomerates operate is progressively liberalized. 
Clear coordination mechanisms (including the allocation of responsibilities) would need 
to be in place between the antitrust authorities and the financial supervisors in order to 
leverage the respective advantages of each one – namely, the broad experience of the 
former in competition issues and the specialized knowledge of the latter in financial 
system issues. A clear and transparent antitrust policy with objective criteria (for 
example, in terms of market definition, size, impact etc.) would also ensure that the ‘rules 
of the game’ are widely understood and respected. 
 
D. Proposed Roadmap 
 
A reform roadmap that includes these proposals needs to clearly distinguish 
between shorter- and longer-term policy measures in order to ensure a smooth 
transition path. It is beyond the scope of this document to propose a priori a detailed 
reform roadmap, but some high-level criteria on selecting short-term versus longer-term 
measures can be identified. This does not mean that longer-term reforms cannot or should 
not start immediately (nor does it mean that all reforms should start at the same time), but 
rather that they will by necessity take longer to reach fruition. The following criteria 
could be used for sequencing the proposed recommendations: 
•  Relative importance, which is a function of the benefits-risks trade-off and 
potential impact – for example, the introduction of collective investment 
schemes and the development of a full-fledged investment banking vehicle are 
arguably the two most important specific recommendations  
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•  Ease of implementation, which is a function of their complexity and the 
associated need for active consultation and involvement of all relevant parties 
– for example, allowing banks to directly offer financial leasing services is 
likely to be much easier to implement (but less important) than revising the 
hierarchy of the legal framework 
•  Potential for ‘bundling’, meaning that certain recommendations are related 
and work on them can progress concurrently so that they are included into a 
single reform package – for example, general recommendations 4A and 4B on 
financial conglomerates 
•  Inter-dependence, where the implementation of certain recommendations is 
conditional on others – for example, allowing banks to directly offer fiduciary 
activities and to undertake investment banking should not take place until the 
legal and regulatory framework on conflicts of interest is revised accordingly 
and effectively enforced. 
The authorities will need to balance the relative importance that they attach on each of 
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